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RONALD C. BROWN 
Public Sector Collective Bargaining: 
An Emerging Reality 
VIRGINIA attorneys who find themselves involved in cases dealing with public sector collective bar-
ga ining soon learn that the legal issues are often inter-
woven with many non-legal, emotion-laden political 
issues. This article attempts to sort out the two and 
present an overview examination of the background 
and current legal status of existing or potential public 
sector bargaining relationships in the Commonwealth, 
and provide suggestions as to the role an attorney 
might play in those relationships. 
The appearance of public sector unionism in Vir-
ginia is not a passing local phenomenon but rather 
part of a national trend which presently finds over 
half of the federal employees and nearly 30 percent of 
state and local employees under union contract. In 
fact public employee union membership is exploding 
at a rate 600 times that of its private sector counter-
part and defacto, extra-legal bargaining relationships 
abound even absent authorizing legislation. 
Reasons for this growth can be traced historically to 
management and pay practices; but suffice it to say 
that regardless of the original reasons for union de-
velopment, it has today to a large measure become a 
self-generating and self-sustaining process as the unions 
have assumed the role of championing the various 
needs of employees as they arise. And, in view of the 
present state of our economy which combines infla-
tion with an over-abundant supply of workers there 
is every reason to predict that public employees will 
be demanding more compensation and that public em-
ployers, in view of a ready supply of labor, need not 
necessarily be responsive. Thus, the ingredients are 
present for increased union militancy ; and, in view 
of the Virginia Assembly's decision not to control the 
situation by creating a statutory fram ework within 
which existing bargaining relationships could be super-
vised, it becomes important to examine the legal status 
of bargaining relationships which mayor do exist in 
Virginia even absent authorizing legislation. 
The Non-Legal Context 
To adequately discuss the legal status of such re-
lationships it is useful to assess the existing non-legaJ 
context within which the legal arguments are often 
entangled. The most emotional issue that inevitably 
becomes part of a discussion about public sector union-
ism is that of strikes by government employees. Many 
people equate strikes with the existence of public 
employee unions. The statistics do reveal an apparent 
correlation between the existence of enabling legisla-
tion for publi c sector bargaining and the growth of 
public employee union membership, and, to a degree, 
an increased number of public employee strikes. Yet 
according to Labor Department figures, strikes by 
government employees resulted in approximately .03 
percent of total work time lost versus a figure ten times 
as high (.32 percent) in the private sector. Of course 
public employee strikes are more highly visible than 
private sector strikes and cause greater public incon-
venience (if not incapacity) and therefore are pro-
hibited in all but a few states. 1 Strikes continue how-
ever in states with and without bargaining legislation 
notwithstanding these statutory prohibitions, which 
has caused some states to experiment with alternatives 
to the strike prohibition. 
Public opinion polls indicate that a clear majority 
of the public favors the right of public employees to 
belong to unions and to bargain and by a closer mar-
gin support their right to strike.2 In Virginia, a recent 
1 See Hearings (III H.R . 12532, H .R . 7681, and H.R. 9324 
Before The S/Jccia[ Committee on Education and Labor, 92 
Congo 2d Sess. ( 1972 ) . 
2 A poll taken in August, 1974 by Calvin Kytlc Associates 
showed 76 percent of the public supported the right of public 
employees to organize and ha rg-a in. In September, 197:1 a 
Harris poll revealed that :1') percent supported org-aniza-
tional rights of public employees ",hill' 29 percent opposed it. 
Interesti ngly, 50 percent supported their r.ight (0 strike " 'hile 
+ 1 percent opposed it. ''''ashington Post , Thlll'sdav, Sep-
tember 4, 1975 p. A3 col. 1. 
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poll (taken by the Commission on State Government 
Management, chaired by State Senator William B. 
Hopkins, of a representative sampling of the State's 
more than 72,000 employees including management 
personnel) supported the finding that Virginia should 
prepare itself for active public sector labor relations. 
The Commission concluded, among other matters, 
that with the continuing growth of organized labor in 
the public sector, Virginia should enact some type of 
labor relations law to meet the developing situation .3 
:\ Daily Press, Newport News, Va. Tuesday, December 23, 
1975 p. 2 col. 1. 
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Legislative Efforts 
The trend towards legitimizing public sector bar-
gaining is illustrated by the fact that nearly forty states 
have passed some type of enabling legislation for bar-
gaining by some of its public employees:! Notwith-
standing this relatively recent increased development 
of state statutory schemes, many groups are promoting 
federal legislation to cover state and local government 
employees, claiming that for the most part state stat-
utes are providing too little, too late, for too few of 
its employees. The two federal bills that have been 
before Congress would cover public employee~ either 
by amending the National Labor Relations Act to 
remove its present exclusion of public employers or by 
creating a new agency under a very far-reaching, com-
prehensive law which among other provisions provides 
for union shops and bargaining by supervisors.5 Since 
the legislation raises issues on the appropriate rela-
tionship between the federal and state governments, 
sponsors of the bills are presently awaiting the out-
come of an analogous case before the U.S. Supreme 
Court which should further define the constitutional 
restraints of federal regulation of state labor relations.6 
For the most part only employee organizations have 
worked for passage of a public sector labor relations 
law in Virginia. Early attempts were made by organi-
zations representing teachers, police, and firefighters, 
respectively, to lobby for special legislation that would 
apply to them. Failing in these attempts, they first 
formed a Virginia coalition of public employee or-
ganizations in the early 1970's which lobbied for 
omnibus bargaining legislation and later affiliated with 
the more powerful national Coalition of American 
Public Employees (CAPE) to work for the same 
end. In 1976, the Assembly will have considered two 
public sector labor relations bills, one of which would 
legitimize bargaining relationships and the other which 
would establish a statutory framework within which 
meet-and-confer bargaining could take place.7 Even 
4 Brown, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Perspective 
and Legislative Opportunities, 15 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 
57 ( 1973). 
5 Brown, Federal Legislation For Public Sector Collective 
Bargaining: A Minimum Standards Approach, 5 Univ. of 
Toledo L. Rev. 681, 711 (1974) . 
6 National League of Cities v. DunlO/I, No. 74-878 (U.S., 
filed Jan. 17, 1975); and California v. Brennan, No. 74-879 
(U.S., filed J an. 17, 1975). 
7 The enabling legislation, H.B. 621, is sponsored in 
the House by Delegate Thompson and in the Senate by 
Senator Gartlan (S.B. 527 ); A meet and confer bill, H.B. 
986, is sponsored by Delegate Lechner. All died in Committee. 
though no state labor relations statute has yet been 
enacted, recent political pressures did generate legisla-
tive creation of a special Commission To Study The 
Rights of Public Employees. Of the several recom-
mendations coming from this body, none of which 
included establishing a labor relations law, two were 
enacted into law. The first placed public employees 
within the coverage of the Right To Work Law and 
the second created a grievance system for public em-
ployees.8 Still, notwithstanding the lack of enabling 
legislation, public sector collective bargaining in Vir-
ginia flourishes with thousands of local government 
employees under collective bargaining arrangements. 
Since these relationships continue to grow, it is im-
portant for Virginia attorneys to understand the legal 
status of such a relationship. 
The Virginia Position 
Virginia law like most other states expressly pro-
hibits public employee strikes. However, it is silent on 
the question of public sector bargaining rights, with 
the exception of public transit employees who have 
full statutory bargaining rights with impasses resolved 
by binding arbitration. D Therefore, several legal ques-
tions remain in the Commonwealth among which in-
clude whether public employees have ( 1) a constitu-
tionally protected right to organize and join unions; 
and (2) a constitutional right to bargain (i.e. whether 
a public employer ha<; a duty to bargain ) ; and lastly, 
( 3) whether public employers have the authority to 
bargain, if they choose, on the basis of authority im-
plied from the express statutory authority to make 
employment agreements. 
On the issue of organizational rights, as early as 
1935 the Virginia Supreme Court held that public 
employees could not join unions where prohibited by 
public employers. 1o In 1946 the Virginia Assembly 
passed its right to work statute which guarantees em-
ployees the right to work regardless of union or non-
union affiliation.ll During the same legislative session, 
the Senate passed Joint Resolution Number 12 which 
8Va. Code Ann. § 15.1-7.1 (S llpp. 1975). Additionally, 
Virginia's Sta ndards o f Quality adopted by the G eneral As-
sembly requires school boards to a dopt the gri eva nce pro-
cedure promulgated by the State Board of Education. The 
Board apparently designed its proced ures partially to "thwa rt 
the move for collective bargaining legislat ion by the V irg inia 
General Assembly." S tate D epartment of Educa tion. S llptS. 
Memo No. 7703 , November 7, 1975 p . 2. 
9 Va. Code Ann. ~ 15.1-1357 .2 (Supp. 1975). 
10 rart!! r v. Tlw1IIfison , l fi4 Va. 32 1, 180 S.E. '1·10 ( 1935 ) . 
11 Va. Code Ann. ~ 40.1-58 I!t seq . (Supp. 1973) . 
in essence stated that it is contrary to public policy for 
State, county, or municipal employers to recognize or 
negotiate collective bargaining agreements with a labor 
union representing public employees and contrary to 
public policy for public employees to form organiza-
tions affiliated with any labor union to discuss con-
ditions of employment or to claim the right to strikeY 
In 1955, a lower Virginia court reaffirmed the power 
of a local government to promulgate rules barring 
fire-fighters from unionizing.13 It also held Virginia's 
right to work law inapplicable to public employees. 
Thus, by 1955 the Virginia law clearly prohibited 
public employees from forming or joining unions. 
By the end of the next 20 years however, this pro-
hibition was completely reversed. The reversal began 
with ca~es like Atkins v. City of Charlotte arising in 
federal courts outside Virginia but which clearly 
placed a constitutional cloak of protection around 
public employees' organizational rights. H Virginia's 
Attorney General thereafter took cognizance of the 
developing constitutional right to unionize and in 
1969 advised public officials that such rights existed. 
Although State Attorney General opinions in Virginia 
are merely advisory to local government5, Virginia fed-
eral courts have since ruled on the issue and sustained 
that opinion holding that public employees have the 
right to associate and rules or ordinances which forbid 
the same are unconstitutional.1:' Virginia courts have 
also held that Senate J oint Resolution Number 12 is 
merely a statement of policy and is without the force 
oflaw. 10 
A second source of law which establishes the right 
cf public employee~ to unionize is found in the 1973 
amendment to Virginia's right to work law which in 
extending coverage to public employees provided by 
incorporation that "nothing herein contained shall be 
construed to prevent or make illegal the peaceful and 
orderly solicitation and persua5ion by union members 
of others to join a union. "17 In sum , the right of 
public employees in Virginia to form and join unions 
12 S.]. R es . 12, Va . General Assembly ( 194fi). 
13 Verhaagen v. R eeder rCt. of L. & C h. , Norfolk, V a., 
( 1955 ) (unreported )] afilJeal Tc fused. 198 Va. lXXIX 
( 1956 ), cerl. denied 353 U.S. 974. 
14 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W .D. N.C . 1969) . 
] 5 1969-70 Va . Atty. Gen. Op. 158; Carrol v. City of 
Norfolk, Civil Action No . 524-70-N (E.D. Va., Apr. 20, 
197 1); Fire Fighters, Local 794 v . City of Newport N ews, 
339 F .Supp. 13 (E.D. Va. 1972). 
10 FiTe Fighters, Local 794 v. City of New/JoTt News, 307 
f. Supp.1l1 3 (E. D . Va. 1969) . 
17 Va. Cocle Ann. § 40. 1-58. 1 (Supp. 1973) incorporating 
Va. Code Ann. § 40. 1-fifi (Supp. 197::1). 
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is clearly established, based both on constitutional and 
statutory authority. 
The second major legal issue is whether public 
employees have a constitutional right to bargain as a 
concomitant to the right to organize. In other words 
doc" the public employer have a duty to bargain with 
its employees? Although the right to organize does 
carry with it a prohibition of employer discrimination 
against employees engaging in protected union activ-
ities, arguments that the constitutional right to or-
ganize implies a right to bargain have thus far been 
unsuccessful. However, the issue continues to be 
raised, as is illustrated by a recent ruling in a federal 
district court in Virginia. In overruling a motion to 
dismiss, the court held that a public employer's re-
fusal to meet with a union could have a "chilling 
effect" on first amendment rights and the court sug-
gested that "the grant of approval to organize and 
associate without the corresponding grant of recogni-
tion may well be an empty and meaningless gesture."18 
That type of holding has been the exception and the 
overwhelming body of legal precedent on the issue at 
the present time clearly does not mandate collective 
bargaining absent enabling legislation .1n 
Two Virginia cases have sustained that position 
although the opinion of the most recent case, T eam-
sters Local Union No . 822 of Norfolk, Virginia v. 
City of Portsmouth, Virginid,2° tended to obfuscate 
the actual issue being decided, namely whether the 
constitutional right of public employees to associate 
included the right to bargain. Both that case and the 
Firefighters case held that public employees in Virginia 
are under no dut y to bargain either because of ex-
press legislative authorization (since it is absent ) nor 
by judicial interpretation of the constitution. The 
Firefighters case raised an additional issue by stating 
that "[W]e hasten to point out that . .. public em-
ployees .. . are not precluded from sitting down at a 
table with representatives of the city and discussing 
matters concerning the employment relationship."21 
The issue raised is whether a public employer may, 
if it chooses, meet and discuss labor relations matters 
with a union and if it reaches an agreement in those 
18 R ichmond Educ . Ass'n . v. C"ock fmd , 55 F.R.D. 362 
(E.D. Va. 1972) . 
In Beauba ef v. D elgado Co llege, 428 F. 2d 470 (5 th C ir. 
1970 ); Indianopolis Edu c. Ass'n . v. Le wallen, 72 L.R.R.M. 
207 1 (7 th C ir. 1969); United Fed'n. of Postal Clerks v. 
Blollnt, 325 F. Su pp. B79, 883 (D .D.C. 197 1) . 
~oCiv i l acti on No . 75- I!H-N (E.D. Va., !\ugust II , 19 75). 
21 339 F.Supp. 13, a t 17 (E.D. Va. 1972). 
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discussions whether it may embody them in an agree-
ment which will be legally enforceable. 
The remaining crucial legal question is whether 
public employers may voluntarily enter into a ne-
gotiating relationship with a public employee union 
absent enabling legisla tion and negotiate an enforce-
able contract on the basis of implied authority. This 
question has been considered by courts outside Vir-
ginia and the traditional view has been that a public 
employer may not bargain with its employees absent 
express authorizing legislation.22 The justifications ad-
vanced to support this position are usually rooted in 
concepts of state sovereignty and illegal delegation of 
powers to public employee unions. The persuasiveness 
of these arguments have tended to diminish over the 
years in view of government employers' implicit au-
thority to negotiate innumerable provisions in its con-
struction and supply contracts, by the unifonn hold-
ings under state legislation and court rulings that no 
agreement or even concessions to employee demands 
are required,2a and by the increasing body of exper-
ience built up in those states with legislation. 
Current Developments 
The current developing law on the implied author-
ity of a public employer to bargain with its employees 
or their representative indicates that the courts have 
begun to reject the traditional arguments.2'J For ex-
ample where school boards are explicitly empowered 
to supervise a school system and enter into individual 
22 See Dole, State and Loca l Publi c Employee Collective 
Bargaining in the Absence of Explicit Legislative Authoriza-
tion, 54 la . L. Rev. 539 (1969). Infl. Union of Operating 
Engineers, Lo cal 321 v. Wat er Works Board of the City of 
Birmingham, 276 Ala . 462, 163 So. 2d 61 <) ( 19fi4); Wichita 
Public Schools Em/!loyees Union , Local 513 v. Smith, 194 
Kan. 2, 397 P .2d 357 ( 1964); and dictum in S tat e of D ela-
ware v. AFSCME, Lo cal 1726, 8 1 L.R.R.M. 2836 (D el. Ch. 
New County, 1972). 
23 For example, the N LR!\ imposes an ob li gation to ba r-
gain but specifica lly slales that "sLl ch obliga tion does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or req ui re the 
making of a concession . ... " 29 U.s.C. ~ 15.8( d ) ( 19 70 ). 
24 See East Chicago T eachers Union , Lo ca l 511 v. B oard of 
T rustees, .... .. Ind . !\pp ... ... , 287 N. E. 2d 89 1 ( 1972); L ocal 
4, Gary Teach ers Union v . School City of Ga ry, ..... Ind. 
!\pp . ... , 284 N .E. 2d 108 ( 1972) ; Cook County Police 
Ass'n v. City of Harve y, 8 Ill. App. 3d 147, 289 N.E. 2d 
226 ( 1972); C hicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n. v. Board of 
Educ., 76 Ill. !\pp. 2C\ 4:i6, 222 N .E. 2cl 243 ( 1966); State 
Board 0/ Regen ts v. United Pa cking Hou se Food & Allied 
Work ers, 175 N .W. 2d 110 ( Iowa 1970) (additi onally holding 
no implied authority to grant exclusive recogniti on ). Board 
of Education v. S co ttsdale Eduwtiol1 /lssociation, 17 Ariz. 
!\pp. 504, 49B P. 2d 578 ( 1972 ) . 
con tracts, courts are finding less difficulty in implying 
a ut hority to enter into a ma.<;ter agreement. Recent 
d ecisions such as those by the Ohio Supreme Court 
h ave explicitly upheld this proposition and held that 
t he school board was unable to arbitrarily terminate 
i ts agreement and must honor its contractual duty to 
b argain in good fa ith.25 H owever, even in view of this 
e merging trend of law, one cannot safel y predict 
' ud icial approval of such agreements, due to the tra-
d itional jealousy surrounding governmental sover-
e ignty. 
The issue in Virginia ha.<; not been resolved. Al-
t hough the recent T eamsters L ocal Union 8222(; in-
cluded language alluding to the lack of authori ty of 
a public employer to bargain absent statutory authori-
zation, a close reading of the case shows that the 
holding is speaking to the issue presented by the case 
- w hether a public employer m ust bargain with a 
pub lic employee union because of the constitutional 
r ight of public employees to organize. The answer, as 
d iscussed, is clearly negative. 
Analogous case law in Virginia can be found in 
J.\tf cK ennie v. C harlottesville and Albermarle Rail-
road27 where the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia held that a municipal corporation having explicit 
aut hority to contract also therefore had implied au-
thority to negotiate an arbitration provision. A similar 
result was reached in Howard v . School Board of 
Alleghany County28 where it was held that the board 
had implied authority to negotiate on matters inci-
dentally rela ted to the school board's express powers. 
In sum, the trend of case law outside the Common-
'wealth of Virginia is finding increa'iingly that implied 
authority to negotiate absent explicit legislative au-
25 D ayton C lassroom T eachers Ass' n. v . Dayton Board of 
Edt/C., 4 1 Ohio Street 2d 127,323 N .E. 2d 714 ( 1975 ) ; and 
see, V inton Coun ty L ocal T eachers Ass'n . v. V inton County 
Board of Educ. BNA's Gov' t. E mpl oyee Rei . REP (GERR ) 
No. 574, a t B-1 ( 1974 ) ( defining good fa ith ); N ortlt R oyalt on 
Education A ss'n . v. North Royalt on Bd . of Educ., 4 1 O hi o 
App. 2d 209, 76 L C ~ 53,69 1 ( 197+ ) . 
26 S u pra note 20. H oweve r a ease has beenfilcd on tha t 
issue which may soon resolve the question. Ne w/JOrt N ews 
Education A ssn . v. School Board of N ewlJOrl N ews, Case 
No. 75-716 fil ed in C ircuit Court on f ebrlla ry 19, 1976. 
2 1 11 0 Va . 70, 65 S.E. 503 ( 1909 ) Arbit ra ti on was ma de 
available to interes ted pa rties by Va. Cock Ann. S 8-503 
(then § 3006 ) (S upp. 1975 ) . 
2 8 203 Va. 55, 122 S.E . 2d 89 1 ( 196 1) ; but see W ilso n v. 
StQte Highway C om m'r. , 174 Va. 82,4 S.E. 2d 746 ( 1939) . 
See also, Batchellor v. Common wealt h, 176 Va. 109, 105 
S.£. 529 ( 1940 ) . 
thoriza tion is permitted. In Virginia there is no direct 
or clear case law to either preclude or permit public 
sector bargaining though it has been held that meet-
ing and conferring with employees is permissible. 
The State Attorney General has issued a series of 
opinions on the question of implied authority to ne-
gotiate in V irginia. In 1970, he stated that if a public 
agency were to negotiate it would need to be based 
on implied authori ty, but in view of the 1946 Senate 
Resolution against collective bargaining and because 
implied authority to negotiate had met with scant 
favor as a principle of law he advised that the better 
practice would he to enact enabling legislation if bar-
gaining was desired. 2 ~ In a subsequent opinion he 
observed that a school hoard could meet and discuss 
working conditions with employee groups and embody 
the results of those discussions in resolutions but any 
agreements reached would be of "dubious enforce-
ability. " ~o In 1974, the Attorney General advised that 
authority to bargain collectively cannot be implied 
from general powers granted localities and that local 
governments may not enter into such agreements 
absent express statutory authority, from the General 
Assembly.31 In a later opinion he summarized his 
position that a public employer may not collectively 
bargain absent express statutory authorization but it 
may meet and discuss working conditions with its 
employees and adopt agreements embodying those 
points agreed upon in the discussion a'S long as it 
retained final decision-making power over such agree-
ments.32 
In summary, the present status of Virginia law 
on the issue of public sector bargaining rights is that 
it has recognized a constitutional right to form and 
join unions and has held that such a right does not 
give rise to a constitutional right to bargain . H ow-
ever, judicial precedent outside Virgini a is building 
that would permit a public employer, if it wishes, to 
engage in collective hargaining and to negotiate an 
agreement absent explicit statutory authorization. In-
side Virginia the outcome of that issue is less certain 
though there seems to be an alogous case law to sup-
port the finding of implied authority to enter into 
master contracts with employee representatives. 
2n 1969-70 Va . Att'y. Gen. O p. 158. 
:10 I d. at 23 1, 232. 
:11 O pinion to D elega te H oward Ca rwile O ctober 7, 197·1. 
:~ ~ O pinion ( 0 the H Ollorable Frederi c Lee Ruck, Coullt y 
Attorney for Fa irfax County Novell1b(~ r 1 ~), 1()7+ . 
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Drafting Bargaining Agreements 
:?;..~tul11 ing to the original observation that legal 
issues on public sector collective bargaining are often 
interwoven with non-legal, emotional, or political con-
siderations, it should be re-stated that some 25 or 30 
percent of the Commonwealth's teachers and a signifi-
cant number of other public employees are presently 
under collective bargaining agreements. While it is 
clear that one option available to public employers in 
Virginia (and being exercised in most ca5es) is to re-
fuse to negotiate, it is equally clear that some employ-
ers have chosen to "meet and confer," or engage in 
"professional negotiations," or, more simply put, 
collectively bargain. In each situation the result is the 
same. The employer has chosen, for whatever reason, 
to deal with a particular employee-designated repre-
sentative and negotiate an agreement. 
If the employer has chosen this course, it IS Im-
portant for Virginia attorneys to understand that in 
the absence of legislative guidance there exists both 
contractual and constitutional pitfalls in the bargain-
ing relationship. Thoughtful drafting of any agree-
ment is required to avoid the real possibility of union-
dominated first agreements. First, a contractual obli-
gation may be created notwithstanding the uncertainty 
of a court finding implied authority if the parties agree 
to incorporate a memorandum of their understanding 
into individual teacher contracts. Thus legitimized, 
other agreed upon provisions substantive and pro-
cedural (such as a duty to bargain in good faith , etc.) 
may be legally enforceable. And as with any contract, 
in the absence of a clearly stated meaning, a court 
could be called in to interpret and in some cases define 
the meanings of such words as good faith, bargainable 
subjects, grievable items, and unfair conduct. There-
fore, it is imperative to draft such procedural agree-
ments with much clarity and as much specificity as is 
desired, should a court be called in to interpret its 
provisions. Additionally, some consideration will need 
to be given to the extent to which certain powers are 
reserved to the employer such as the right to hire and 
fire or subjects for negotiations to name just a few. 
These so-called management rights clauses can pre-
vent a multitude of later disagreements on issues of 
authority that inescapahly arise even in jurisdictions 
with statutes. In effect, it is suggested that the drafts-
men of bargaining agreements create their own "pri-
vate statutory scheme" hoth in the substantive pro-
visions and in procedural requirements that govern 
the hargaining relationship itself a<; well a<; any secret 
12 
ballot election process used to cstablish and maintain 
that relationship. 
Of course there are risks to a public employer in 
aOTeeine: to abide bv certain procedures in the pre-
..., u • 
election, negotiation, and contract administration 
phases of bargaining. A measurable degree of flexi-
hility is compromised by such agreement wherea<; ab-
'lent that agreement the employer in a non-statutory 
state such as Virginia would be free to act mOre 
unilaterally. However, it is also true that a fairly-
arrived at set of procedures provides the necessary con-
~traints for more meaningful bargaining to take place. 
Additionally, the employer may gain enforceable con-
tract rights to control non-compliance with contractual 
provisions (union unfair labor practices etc.) and a 
skillful draftsman can include appropriate remedies for 
non-compliance such as money damages, loss of dues 
check off or other privileges, or even loss of union 
recognition . 
The second potential problem area involves consti-
tutional restraints placed on the public employer. Even 
absent statutory proscription of employer misconduct, 
the constitution limits the employers' ability to dis-
criminate against employees because of their union 
activities.a~ However, public employers very often fail 
to realize that the constitution does not bind it to in-
action and the employer especially during the crucial 
pre-election period retains free speech rights and may 
actively provide persuasive information on the relative 
merits of unionism or of one union versus another or 
to deny the use of institutional advantages such a<; 
,chool mailhoxesY Additionally, public employers 
may limit the rights of their employees to solicit on 
hehalf of the union to certain prescribed non-working 
periods by establishing a valid no-solicitation rule .35 
Constitutional limits do exist however. For example, 
although the employer retains the right of free speech, 
the 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause of the 
( Continued on jJage 16) 
:13 E .g., AFSCME v. W oodward, 4-06 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 
1969 ); McLaugh lin v. Tilen dis , 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 196B); 
Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W .D. N .C. 
1969 ). 
:H See e .g. Los Angeles T eachers Union, AFT Local 1021 
v. Los Angeles City Board of Education, 71 Ca l. 2d 551, 4-55 
P.2d 827 ( 1969); Friedman v . Union Free School District 
No. I , Town of Islip , 314 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. N.Y. 1970 ) ; 
and for the samc principl e in the private sector scc NLRB v. 
.1nnco Drainage & M etal Products . Inc. , 220 F.2d 573 (6th 
Cir. 1955 ) cert. denied 350 US. 838 ( 1955). 
:15 See e.g .. Friedman v. Union Free School District, 314 
F. SlIpp. 223 IE.D. N.Y. 1970): and T inker v. Des Moines 
Tnde/I. Comm1lnity School Dist. . 393 US. 503 ( 1969). 
Evaluations of Job Being Done by Virginia 
State Bar in Disciplining Lawyers 
Excel- No t 
lent Good Fair Poor S ure 
% % ')10 % % 
All R es/lOndents ... ....... 6 29 24 14 27 
Northern V irgini a ... .... . 8 2'1 15 15 38 
T idewater ... ....... ......... ... 7 35 28 9 21 
R ichmond .. .............. ... . 2 27 24 14 33 
Southwest ........... ........... 4 33 3 1 19 13 
Valley/Piedmont ....... ... 4 29 25 11 28 
Southside ...................... 8 23 19 16 34 
Great confi dence .......... 11 40 22 c· . ) 22 
Little/no confidence .... 'l· 21 26 27 22 
Professional/executive .. 3 28 28 21 20 
White collar .... .... 6 28 20 15 31 
Blue collar ............ .. .. .... 6 31 24 12 27 
Feelings T oward Specializatiorn Among Lawyers 
Goo d n ad No t 
Idea Idea Sure 
% % % 
All R es/J ondents .......... ........ 63 22 15 
Own lawyer ... ..... .... ....... .. ... 61 22 17 
Consulted lawyer ................ 64 22 14· 
Never consulted ... 58 23 19 
18-34· ....... ...... . .. ................ .. 69 21 10 
35-49 ...... .............. ...... ...... 63 23 14 
50 and over .................. ...... 57 22 21 
U nder $7,000 ... .. .... _ ...... ... ... 57 21 22 
$7,000-$ 12,499 ... .. .... .. . .... 64 23 13 
$12,500-$19,999 . ... .... ........ 67 20 13 
$20,000 and over ......... .. ... .. 62 24 14· 
Predicted Results of Proposed Specialization 
Among Lawyers 
Easier to H igher 
M allJ) l-,awye rs for 
No t iDeTe nt 
Find Lawye r R at eJ Cases S ure 
% % % % 
All Respondents ..... 60 11 18 11 
Norlhern Virginia .. 71 7 13 9 
Tidewater ... ....... ... .. 63 9 23 5 
Richmond ....... .... ..... 48 19 19 14 
Southwest ...... ... .... 67 11 18 4 
Valley / Piedmont 52 10 16 22 
Southside ............... 54 10 20 16 
Own lawyer ............ 59 12 19 10 
Consulted lawyer ... . 62 11 18 9 
Never consulted 55 11 19 15 
18-34 .. ... .. ... ... .... 6;) 8 19 8 
35-49 .... 62 11 16 11 
50 and over ...... ... 55 12 19 14· 
Under $7,000 ...... 5) 9 20 16 
$7,000-$ 12,499 ..... ... 61 10 20 9 
$ J 2,500-$19,999 63 13 14 10 
$20,000 and over . 63 11 19 7 
-
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Collective Bargaining 
(C on ti71u ed fro 111 /Jage 12) 
Constitution limits it from denying equal treatment to 
unions competing for recognition during the pre-
election periods in matters such as use of school mail-
boxes or other facilities.:lG Also, an employer absent 
statutory authority may again run afoul of the 14th 
Amendment if it chooses either before or after a union 
election to meet with only one of several employee 
organizations seeking an audience with the public 
employer37 Thus, a grant of exclusive recognition by 
a public body promising to meet only with the union 
representative, absent some legislative authority, raises 
significant constitutional questions. 
In conclusion, it is apparent to any observer of 
the legal problems involved in public sector collective 
bargaining that the legal issues raised are many and 
complex even in states providing a legislative frame-
work. Questions involving the protection of employees' 
free choice during the pre-election period, and ques-
tions relating to the appropriate bargaining unit, the 
scope of bargainahle issues, the limits on employer 
and union unfair labor practices are in a statutory 
state considered within the framework of an adminis-
trative structure staffed by Jabor relations experts. To 
permit such complex questions to remain in the neb-
ulous state as exists in Virginia invites both disrespect 
for the law and possible violations of the public interest 
when public employers and unions negotiate improper 
subjects or permit an inordinate dislocation of avail-
able public resources due to union pressures, all of 
which presently remain unregulated, and unsupervised 
in Virginia. 
36 Although, as discussed, the use of school mailboxes for 
organizational activities may be limited, once they are made 
available to one union it will usually be unconstitutional to 
deny use to another union absent authorizing legislation. See 
e.g., Dade County Cla.ssroom T eachers Assoc. v. R yan, 225 
So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969 ) ; and Local 1880 of AFT v. Fla. Bd. 
of R egents, 355 F. Supp. 594 (N.D . F la. 1973). 
37 See e.g., City of Madison Join t School Dist . No.8 v. 
W .E.R .C., ...... Wis. 2d ..... . , 23 1 N.E. 2d 206 ( 1975 ) ; and 
Board of School Direct01s, ...... W is. 2d ...... , 168 N.W. 2d 42 
( 1969). Additionally, with only infrequent exception courts 
will not find implied authority to grant excllisive recogni tion. 
See e.g., State Bd. of R egen ts v. Un ited Packing House Food 
& Allied W orkers, 175 N .W. 2d 110 ( Iowa 1970 ) (no im-
pli ed authority); and contTa , Chicago Diu. of Ill . Edu c. Ass'n. 
v. Board of Edu c., 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N .E. 2d 243 
( 1966). 
